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Summary  findirngs
Credibility and transparency are at the core of the  Frankel, Fajnzylber, Schmukler, and Serv6n investigate
current debate about exchange rate regimes. The steady  how difficult it is for investors to verify from observable
growth in the magnitude and variability of international  data whether the authorities are in fact following the
capital flows has complicated the question of whether to  exchange rate regime they claim to be following.
use floating, fixed, or intermediate exchange rate  Of the various intermediate regimes, they focus on
regimes.  basket pegs with bands. Statistically,  it can take a
Emerging market economies are abandoning basket  surprisingly long span of data for an econometrician or
pegs, crawling pegs, bands, adjustable pegs, and various  investor to verify whether such a regime is actually in
combinations of these.  operation.
One of several reasons intermediate regimes have  The authors find that verification becomes more
fallen out of favor is that they are not transparent; it is  difficult as the regime's bands widen or more currencies
very difficult to verify them. Verifiability is a concrete  enter the basket peg.
example of the principle of "transparency" so often  At the other extreme, they also analyze regimes
invoked in discussions  of the new international financial  described as free floating and find that in some cases the
architecture but so seldom made precise. A simple peg or  observed exchange rate data do validate the announced
a simple float may be easier for market participants to  regime.
verify than a more complicated intermediate regime.
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The choice of exchange rate regime - floating, fixed, or somewhere  in between  -
is an old  question in international monetary economics.  But the steady increase in
magnitude and variability of international capital flows has complicated the question.
This is particularly the case for the developing countries that in the 1990s became full-
fledged  participants in international  financial markets.
A major new element in the debate is the proposition that emerging market
countries are, or should be, abandoning basket pegs, crawling pegs, bands, adjustable
pegs, and various combinations  of these. The currently-fashionable  view is that countries
are being pushed to the "corners," the extremes of either free floating or firm fixing.  The
intermediate  regimes are said to be no longer viable. This proposition  is variously called
the hypothesis of the vanishing intermediate  regime, the missing middle, or the corners
solution. Its life history has gone from birth to conventional wisdom in a remarkably
short  period of time.
The motivation of  this paper is  the observation that,  as fashionable as this
proposition  has become, few of its proponents, if any, have offered an analytical  rationale
for it, let alone a fully worked out theoretical model.  Our aim is to offer a possible
theoretical rationale. We seek to introduce the notion of verifiability, and to suggest  that
a simple  peg or a simple float may be more verifiable by market participants  than a more
complicated  intermediate  regime. Verifiability  is a concrete instance of the more general
principle of "transparency" that is so often invoked in recent discussions of the new
international  financial architecture  but so seldom  made precise.
IL.a  Motivation
Consider the exchange rate regime that a number of emerging markets had in the
1  990s: a band around a central parity that itself is a basket with a rate of crawl. So far as
existing theory is concerned, the complexity of this arrangement  has no implications for
its credibility. But, in truth, when a central bank announces a regime of this type, the
public has no way of verifying quickly, by observing the exchange rate, whether the
central bank is doing what it claims to be doing.
A central  bank does not earn credibility  merely by announcing  a monetary  regime
with a nominal anchor such as the exchange rate, even if its intentions are sincere. The
public will judge credibility from data available to it.  If the announced exchange rate
regime is a simple dollar peg, a market participant  need only check that the exchange rate
today is the same as the exchange  rate yesterday,  in order to verify that the central bank is
indeed following its announced policy.  If  the announced regime is a pure  float, a
participant can essentially  check every month whether the central bank has intervened  in
the market by seeing whether its reserve holdings have changed. Under the basket band,
by contrast,  the market participant  needs more months of data in order to be able to verify
that the central bank is indeed implementing  the announced  policy. When comparing the
corners, simple pegs tend to  be  more immediately verifiable than floating regimes.
Typically, a market participant needs some extra piece of information, like reserves, or
more data to check that an exchange  rate is truly floating. How many months of data he
or she needs is the central analytical  exercise of this paper.
We are not claiming that verifiability  is necessarily the complete story behind the
purported  non-viability  of intermediate  regimes. And we are certainly not claiming  that it
2is the only criterion,  or even the most important  criterion,  in the larger debate about fixed
and floating exchange rate regimes.  Many other factors, whether from the traditional
optimum currency area literature or the newer criteria associated with credibility and
financial  markets,  need to be taken into account.  '  Our goal is rather to offer an attempt at
what, so far  as we are aware, may be  the first  explicit analytical rationale for the
proposition  that intermediate  regimes are less viable than the corner  regimes.
In this paper, we demonstrate  the difficulties  of verifiability  for the case of a band
around a basket peg.  We believe that the same difficulties apply to other intermediate
exchange rate regimes, such as a managed float or adjustable peg.  One could model a
managed float, as a central target and a central bank policy of intervening partially to
offset market forces when they push the exchange rate away from that target.  But one
would have to estimate the central target, and measure somehow the pressure of current
market forces in order to figure out to what extent the authorities were intervening to
resist them, a difficult econometric exercise.  One could model an adjustable peg as a
fixed exchange rate with an escape clause: the central bank has an explicit or implicit rule
of abandoning the peg when an exogenous shock of a particular size occurs, and when a
particular percentage of its foreign exchange reserves have been exhausted.  Verifying
that sort of rule would be  even harder than the others because usually few relevant
observations  will occur in the sample period, and even when the adjustment takes place,
there is little way in practice of verifying  whether on the one hand the putative exogenous
shock in fact occurred, or on the other hand the government's commitment  to monetary
discipline was not sincere in the first place.  We choose to explore verifiability for the
case of the basket band rather than the other examples because it is a cleaner econometric
'Two  recent reviews are Larrain and Velasco (1999)  and Frankel (1999).
3exercise. We also look at countries that are believed to be floating, to offer a contrast to
those that are believed to follow basket bands.
This paper explores the amount of information  that it takes for market participants
to verify announced exchange rate regimes from observed data.  The goal of the paper is
to show the difficulty to verify exchange rate regimes and how this varies with regimes.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that performs this type of exercise.  We use
observed exchange rate data and simulated data to provide empirical estimates. The fact
that countries vary their exchange rate regime over time allows us to run this experiment
for regimes of different complexity.
Regarding bands, the paper confirms the intuitive notion that  wide bands are
harder to verify than narrow bands. It is often difficult or impossible to estimate the
weights of the central parity with only one or two years of data.  Regarding regimes
announced as free-floating, the paper shows that  in  some  cases the  exchange rates
observed under such regimes are correlated with those of major currencies. In this sense,
they behave similarly to the basket countries.  It is not straightforward to verify them,
when only using exchange rate data.
To  complement  the  tests  performed  with  real  data,  we  run  Monte  Carlo
experiments to  obtain more general conclusions and to provide results regarding the
amount  of  information necessary to  estimate  regimes  of  interest.  Monte  Carlo
experiments,  displayed in the Appendix, confirm that more complex regimes take a larger
amount of data to be verified.  The Monte Carlo exercise shows the role of a number of
factors in determining verifiability:  the band size, number of currencies in the basket, the
rate of crawl, sample period, periodic adjustments of the central parity.  The results
4confirm the intuition  that the amount of infornation necessary  to verify the exchange  rate
regimes increases  with the complexity  of the regime.
The rest  of  the paper is  organized as follows. The rest  of  the  introduction
introduces the verifiability  problem.  Section II describes the framework and empirical
strategy used to verify exchange rate regimes.  Section III presents estimations for the
case of exchange rate bands.  Section IV shows the results from free-floating regimes.
The main conclusions  are summarized  in Section  V.  Appendix 1 displays a small Monte
Carlo exercise extending the  study of regime verification to  simulated models, and
Appendix 2 gives more details on the construction of the numeraire and the estimated
models.
I.b Intellectual  Origins  of the Corners  Hypothesis
What is known about the origins of the hypothesis of the vanishing intermediate
regime? The original reference is believed to be Eichengreen (1994).  The context was
not emerging markets, but rather the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.  The ERM
crisis of 1992 and band-widening  of 1993 suggested  to some that a gradual transition to
European Economic and Monetary Union, where the width  of the target zone was
narrowed in steps, might not be the best way to proceed after all.  (Crockett, 1994, made
the same point.)  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) concluded, "A careful examination of the
genesis of speculative  attacks suggests  that even broad-band  systems in the current EMS
style pose difficulties, and that there is little, if any, comfortable middle ground between
floating rates and the adoption  by countries of a comnmon  currency." The lesson that "the
5best way to cross a chasm is in a single  jump" was seemingly borne out subsequently,  by
the successful  leap from wide bands to EMU in 1998-99.
After  the  East  Asia  crises  of  1997-98, the  hypothesis  of  the  vanishing
intermediate regime was applied to  emerging markets.  In the effort to  "reform the
international  financial  architecture"  so as to minimize the frequency  and severity of crisis
in  the  future, the  proposition was  rapidly  adopted by  the  international financial
establishment  as the new conventional  wisdom.
For example, Summers (1  999a) 2:
"There  is no single  answer,  but in light of recent experience  what is perhaps  becoming
increasingly  clear - and will probably be increasingly reflected in the advice that the
international  community offers - is that in a  world of freely flowing capital there is
shrinking scope for countries to occupy the middle ground of fixed but adjustable  pegs.
As we go forward from the events of the past eighteen months, I expect that countries
will be increasingly  wary about committing  themselves  to fixed exchange  rates, whatever
the temptations these  may offer in the short run, unless  they are also prepared  to dedicate
policy wholeheartedly  to their support and establish extra-ordinary  domestic safeguards
to keep them in place."
Other high-profile examples include Eichengreen (1999, p.104-105),  Minton-
Beddoes  (1999)  and  Council  on  Foreign  Relations  (1999,  p.87).  The  International
Monetary  Fund  has  now  agreed  that  countries  that  get  into  trouble  by  following  an
internediate  regime will in the future not be bailed  out, though  it qualified the scope  of
2  Other high-profile  examples  include Eichengreen  (1999, p.l04-105), Minton-Beddoes  (1999) and
Council  on Foreign  Relations  (1999,  p.87).
6the generalization  a bit, for example,  by allowing  a possible exception for "systemically"
important countries.
It may be that the Economist (1999, p.l5-16) is right that "Most academics now
believe that only radical solutions will work: either currencies must float freely, or they
must be tightly tied (through a currency board or, even better, currency unions)." But the
proposition  remains to be modeled, let alone proven. It seems intuitively right that these
countries,  facing  finicky  international investors  and  rapidly  disappearing  foreign
exchange reserves, had little alternative but to abandon  their pegs and baskets and bands
and crawls and move to a float, unless they were prepared to go to the opposite corner.
But what is the rationale  for this proposition?
I.c Lack of Theoretical  Foundations
What  is  the  analytical rationale  for  the  hypothesis  of  the  disappearing
intermediate regime (or the "missing middle")?  Surprisingly, none currently exists, to
our knowledge.
At first glance, it appears to be a corollary to the principle of the Impossible
Trinity. 3 That principle says that a country must give up one of three goals: exchange
rate stability,  monetary independence,  and financial market integration. It cannot have all
three simultaneously.  If one adds the observation that financial markets are steadily
becoming more and more integrated  internationally,  that forces the choice down to giving
up on exchange rate stability or giving up on monetary independence. But this is not the
3  Summers  (1999b,  p. 326)  is explicit:  "...the  core  principle  of monetary  economics  is a trilemma:  that
capital  mobility,  an independent  monetary  policy,  and the maintenance  of a fixed  exchange  rate  objective
are mutually  incompatible.  I suspect  this  means  that  as capital  market  integration  increases,  countries  will
be forced  increasingly  to more  pure  floating  or more  purely  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes."
7same thing as saying one cannot give up on both, that one cannot have half-stability and
half-independence. There is nothing in existing theory, for example, that prevents a
country from pursuing a target zone of moderate width.  The elegant line of target-zone
theory begun by Krugman (1991), in which speculation helped stabilize the currency,
always assumed perfect capital mobility.  Similarly, there is nothing that prevents the
government from pursuing a managed float in which half of every fluctuation in demand
for its currency is accommodated  by intervention  and half is allowed to be reflected in the
exchange rate.  (To model this, one need only introduce a "leaning against the wind"
central bank: reaction function into  a  standard monetary model  of  exchange rate
determination.) And there is nothing that prevents a country from pursuing a peg that is
abandoned  whenever  there is a shock large enough to use up half its reserves.
Another justification that has been offered is that when a government establishes
any sort of exchange rate target, as did the East Asian countries, its banks and firms
foolishly underestimate the possibility of a  future break in the currency value. 4 As a
result, they incur large unhedged dollar liabilities abroad.  When a devaluation occurs,
their domestic-currency  revenues are inadequate  for servicing their debts, and so they go
bankrupt, with devastating  consequences  for the economy. "It follows that in a world of
high capital mobility  there are only two feasible approaches  to exchange rate policy. One
is not just to peg the exchange rate, but to lock it in - the Argentine strategy...  .The vast
majority of  countries will ...  have to  follow the other alternative of  allowing their
currencies to fluctuate. If the exchange rate moves regularly, banks and firms will have
an incentive  to hedge their foreign  exposures..." (Eichengreen,  1999,  p.105).
8There is little doubt that the focus on  unhedged foreign-currency  debt describes
accurately why the 1997-98 devaluations were economically  devastating to East Asia.
But the  argument, as  stated, has some weaknesses.  First, it appears to  depend on
irrationality  on the part of banks and firms.  Second, it appears to imply that a country
would be better off by gratuitously  introducing extra noise into the exchange rate, to deter
borrowers  from incurring unhedged dollar liabilities.  This seems unlikely to be right.
Third is the point emphasized  by Ricardo Hausmann:  because foreigners are unwilling to
take open positions in the currencies of emerging-market  countries, the admonition to
avoid borrowing in dollars is to some extent an admonition to avoid borrowing at all.
(An admonition  to hedge the dollar exposure is not helpful; someone  has to take the other
side of the futures contract, and this will be difficult in the aggregate if foreigners are
unwilling  to take the open position.) It may well be that this is the right road to go down,
that exchange rate volatility is a way to put some sand in the wheels of the excessive
capital  movements, and that a lower volume of total debt is a good outcome. But if this is
the argument, the proponents should be explicit about it.  In any case, it seems doubtful
that this argument could  be captured by conventional  models.
A third possible justification is that governments that adopt an exchange rate
target, and sometime  later experience a major reversal of capital inflows, tend to wait too
late  before abandoning  the target. As of 1998, we thought we had learned that the one
thing an emerging-market government can do to minimize the eventual pain from a
currency crisis is to try to devalue early enough (or else raise interest rates early enough,
as would happen automatically under a currency board - anything to adjust, rather than
4  The  version  of this  argument  in Eichengreen  (1999,  p.104)  overstates  the extent  to  which  the East  Asians
had  "a stated  commitment  to the peg," as most commentators  have  done as well. In fact  few of the East
9try to finance an ongoing deficit).  Mexico, Thailand and Korea made the mistake of
waiting too long, until reserves ran very low, so that by the time of the devaluation  there
was no good way out, no combination of interest rates and exchange rate that would
simultaneously satisfy  the  financing  constraint  externally  and  prevent  recession
domestically. But exiting from an exchange rate target can be difficult politically. The
lesson is drawn that, to avoid this difficulty, govermnents should either adopt a rigid
institutional fixed-rate commitment (such as the currency boards of Hong Kong and
Argentina),  or, if not prepared to do that, abandon  the peg early.  5
On this basis, when Brazil in the autumn of 1998  delayed the seemingly  inevitable
jettisoning  of the real target, many thought this would be a repeat of the earlier mistakes.
Instead, when the devaluation finally came in January 1999, Brazil's  trade balance
improved sharply,  the  lack  of  confidence subsided, and  output  and  employment
subsequently performed far better than in  neighboring Argentina.  Thus it is  more
difficult to generalize from recent experience than widely believed.  Furthermore, if we
are to use government reluctance to exit a target arrangement as the basis of a model of
the unviability of intermediate regimes,  it seems that we would again require some sort of
irrationality  (or political constraints 6) on the part of policy-makers.
Thus, each of the three arguments  offered - the impossible trinity, the dangers of
unhedged dollar  liabilities, and  the  political difficulty of  exiting - contains some
important  truth. But none seems able to stand as a theoretical  rationale for the superiority
Asian  countries  had  explicit  dollar  pegs.
5 Even  then we had a counter-example:  Indonesia  had widened  the band right  away in 1997,  and  yet that
didn't  save  it. But  one could  argue  that  political  instability  would  have  done Indonesia  in no matter  what.
Taiwan  devalued  promptly,  and  suffered  less  than  the others.
6 Governments  may  have  an incentive  to postpone  devaluations  until after  elections.  See  Emesto  Stein  and
Jorge  Streb  (1998,  1999).
10of the corner solutions over the intermediate  regimes. Is the comers hypothesis,  then, just
a misplaced manifestation of the temptation to believe that the grass is always greener
somewhere  else?
II. Assessing  Verifiability
The  idea behind verifiability is  that  the  government's  announcement of  an
exchange rate regime is more likely to be credible if market participants can check for
themselves from observable data that the announced regime is  in fact in  operation.
Specifically, the goal of our paper is to study how long it takes for financial markets to
identify from the data the rules guiding  the intervention  behavior of the authorities  in the
foreign exchange markets
The process of verification can be modeled along the lines of statistical inference
familiar to econometricians. We are not suggesting that market participants  will literally
run OLS or other sorts of regressions, but rather that they must do something sirnilar
implicitly  to process the available information.
The paper's framework encompasses a broad variety of regimes - simple and
basket pegs with bands and crawl as well as floating regimes.  However, if a country
follows an exact basket peg (i.e., with no band), the problem of statistical inference  is of
limited interest. 7 In practice, however, there is almost always some range of variation in
the observed exchange rate data, even if it is only within a narrow bid-ask spread quoted
by the banking system, or within the +/- 1% range that constituted  a fixed exchange rate
under the rules of the Bretton Woods system. Then the problem of statistical inference  is
11not trivial. For bands of substantial width, the statistical inference can in fact be difficult,
as we shall see.  This is all the more true if one allows for the ever-present  possibility of
shifts in the parameters-basket  weights, band width, rate of crawl, or level of parity-or
changes in the regime altogether,  especially  if some of these shifts are not announced.
In otur  empirical analysis,  we work with a set of emerging countries, for which we
know the announced  exchange rate regimes. We will begin with an analysis of the basket
bands followed by Chile and Israel during the late 1980s and 1990s.8 Given that Chile
and Israel changed their band parameters over time, we are able to examine them under
different regime configurations. Then, we move on to the regimes officially declared as
floating followed  by Brazil, Mexico, Peru, South Korea, and Thailand.
If the currency in question is in  fact following a basket band, the question of
interest is how many data points are necessary,  i.e., how much time must elapse, in order
to verify that the regime is in fact in operation. In general, we will consider an anchored
exchange rate regime to have been verified if it passes two tests.  (1) We fail to reject the
hypothesis that the exchange  rate is following  the announced  basket peg.  (2) We can find
statistically significant  basket parameters,  i.e., can reject the hypothesis that the currency
is behaving like any "random" currency.  These two tests are informative only if they
have adequate  power.  To judge the power of the tests, we perform the same tests with a
randomly generated variable and with a freely floating exchange rate as the dependent
variable. When using these latter variables we should reject the null hypothesis in (1) and
fail to reject that in (2).  In the case of floating regimes, since there are no announced
7In  that case, the announcement of a basket of N major currencies can be verified with N+1 observations,
which is the number needed to estimate exactly the basket weights.  As noted, however, this does not
constitute verification  of an adjustable  peg since we don't observe the terms of the "escape clause."
8 A detailed description of these regimes  can be found in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2.
12pegs we only use the second test.  Below we specify more explicitly the null hypotheses
under consideration.
If an announced  regime of basket bands does not pass these tests, one can argue
that it is not verifiable, which suggests that the country cannot reap the credibility gains
that an anchored exchange rate regime theoretically offers-credibility  in the eyes of
workers and producers who set wages and prices, and in the eyes of speculators  who have
the ability to  attack the central bank's  reserves and bring about a crisis. If viability
requires verifiability,  such a regime may not be viable.
In the case of bands, we are especially  interested also in seeing how the ability to
confirm the announced nominal regime is statistically affected by features such as the
width of the band and the number of foreign currencies  in the basket.
Our approach focuses on the empirical estimation  of the parameters  describing the
exchange rate rule at different sample sizes - e.g., 50, 100, and 200 observations. The
point estimates, their precision, and the tests of the above hypotheses constructed using
them tell us how well can market participants identify the parameters of the regime when
the latter is  10, 20, and 40 weeks old. For this empirical analysis, we need a  basic
framework  and a testing procedure. The rest of this section  is devoted to these questions.
IIa  Basic Framework
We adopt a general formulation  to "nest" a number of altemative regimes. We
assume that  the  exchange rate  for  a  given small country is  given by  a  weighted
13combination  of N foreign currencies, with a possible rate of crawl d and an error term.
The exchange rate is:  9
St =c+dxt+'D(W,sit)+Et.  (1)
where s, is the spot exchange rate of the domestic currency with its value measured in
terms of a numeraire that we will explain momentarily;  s4,  are the spot exchange rates of
the major "strong currencies" measured vis-a-vis the same numeraire; d is the rate of
crawl, which for now is assumed to be fixed during a given sample period; 10 and wi are
the weights given to the currencies included in the basket. Depending  on the specification
of the basket, (D may take different forms, with the simplest one being the  familiar
N
Simple Pegs, Basket Pegs, Crawling  Pegs, Crawling  Baskets
This general case captures many possible regimes, including simple pegs, basket
pegs, crawling pegs, crawling baskets, target zones, certain forms of managed floating,
and free floating. In the case of simple pegs, the value of the currency follows the
exchange  rates of the foreign currency to which it is pegged, plus the crawling rule, and a
stochastic error.  The latter is the error allowed or incurred by the government when
setting the exchange rate. In the case of simple pegs, N (the number of currencies in the
basket) is equal to one.  Under basket pegs, N is bigger than one.  Crawling pegs imply
that d>O. Under crawling baskets,  N>l and d>O.
9 The precise  models  that  we estimated  are described  in Appendix  2, which  also  provides  a description  of
the procedure  followed  by Chile and Israel to construct  the basket  used as central  parity in their band
systems.
14In the case of an exact peg, the error term would vanish, and an OLS regression of
the domestic currency on the foreign currencies to which it is pegged would yield an fe
equal to 1. Verification  is a trivial exercise, whether  the peg is simple or to a basket. This
can be easily illustrated  by examining  the behavior of the central parity in band regimes.
Central parities behave like simple or basket pegs (with or without crawl), depending  on
the regime. Frankel, Schmukler and  Serven (2000) report estimations of a version of
equation (1) above using as dependent variable  the Chilean peso central parity. In all the
cases examined there, the weights of the central parity converge to their announced
values almost immediately. In  our  present context, the  pegged regime  is  verified
instantaneously.  Thus, in the remainder of this paper we concentrate on the cases of
exchange rate bands (target zones) and floating regimes.
Target Zones
In a regime of target zones, a central parity is defined as a function of a single or
multiple foreign currencies and the exchange rate is allowed to  float within a pre-
specified  band around this central  parity. Whenever it hits the boundary, the government
intervenes to keep the exchange rate inside the band.  In many cases, governments  make
intra-band interventions  as well.
In a target zone, the log difference  between the observed spot exchange rate and
the central parity, st,  is determined  by the following  equation:
-b  if st <-b
s, ={b  if s, > b
vt  otherwise
10 One  alternative  would  be to use past  domestic  or future  inflation  rates  relative  to international  inflation
15where s, is defined by equation (1) above and b is the band width.
According to theory, the distribution  of v can be quite complicated. Even under
two simplifying  assumptions  made by Krugman (1991) in a famous article that generated
a  sub-field of research on target zones-that  the band is  100% credible and that the
authorities intervene only at the boundaries-the  distribution is not normal, but rather
follows a particular S-shape."  But extensive empirical investigation of the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism in the 1980s and early 1990s established that the spot rate
does not in fact obey the predicted distribution. There are a number of likely reasons for
this, among them the lack of full credibility of the zones 12 and the prevalence of intra-
marginal  intervention.
For these reasons we  shall assume in  our  work that  v  follows instead an
autoregressive  process, of the form vt = pvt, + ut, where u is iid. In fact, we will focus on
the random walk case of p = 1, in accordance  with most time series analyses of exchange
rates, which cannot reject the unit root hypothesis.' 3
rates?  where the authorities  are believed  to be following  an indexation  policy.
" When the spot rate draws close to one edge, speculators are aware that there is a limit on how far it can
continue to move in that direction. The expected value will show a regression back toward the central
parity. As speculators respond  to that expectation,  they will push the spot rate away from the margin, even
without  any intervention.
12 Imperfect credibility  was in the event  justified by realignments  in the early 1980s, and especially by the
ERM crises of  1.992-93. It is also relevant for the present exercise, which is entirely based on a starting
point that assumes imperfect credibility.
13 In unreported results, we found that estimates of p were practically I in most regressions using equation
(1).  One  extension for further  research would  be  to  use  statistical distributions implied by  more
sophisticated versions of the  target zone theory.  Another would be to  take the  observed statistical
distribution  from historical episodes such as the ERM currencies in the 1980s  or 1990s.
16Managed Floating and Free Floating
While there are many possible patterns of exchange rate intervention, our basic
framework [equation (1)] only allows us to test whether d or wi are different from 0.  In
other words, the government is using some form of nominal anchor or crawling peg rule
14 to guide its operations. Other forms of intervention are not nested in our specification
Hence, we will consider that failure to reject that d=O  and wi=O  is a characterization of a
pure floating regime.  15  In such case, the disturbance term accounts for the entire variance
of the exchange rate.
The Choice of Numeraire
The question of what to  use  as the numeraire to  measure the values of  the
domestic and foreign currencies is a surprisingly subtle one.  In the case of exact pegs it
makes no difference  - so long of course as the same one is used for both dependent and
independent variables alike. The correct weights should emerge, with a perfect statistical
fit, regardless of the numeraire.  But in the general case, the choice of numeraire does
make a  difference.  Past studies have used  a  variety  of  numeraires, including the
consumer  basket of domestic goods (Frankel, 1993,  which emphasized Asian currencies),
the SDR (Frankel and Wei, 1995, which emphasized policies of European currencies),
the Swiss franc (Frankel and Wei, 1994 and Ohno, 1999) and the dollar (Benassy-Quere,
1999).
14 It is possible  to assume that the government  follows  a variance-reducing  form of intervention  but,
without  imposing  some a priori value for the variance  of the underlying  process,  it is not possible  to
identify  the intervention  parameter.
15 We use  the term free-floating  to refer  to a case  where  there  is no correlation  between  the studied  currency
and any of the strong  currencies.  It is possible  to argue  that  under  pure free-floating,  market  forces  might
induce  some  correlation  with  the currencies  of major  trade  partners.
17Upon further reflection,  these measures are not quite right.  We wish to consider
regimes  where  the  central  bank  monitors a  central  parity,  but  routinely  allows
appreciations or  depreciations relative to  that parity  in  response to  such factors as
inflation, unemployment,  trade deficits or surpluses,  various market pressures and so on.
These factors are only partially accommodated  under an intermediate regime such as a
band or managed float, but they have a role nonetheless. We have not chosen to model
explicitly these factors; they are  comprised by  the error  term. The authorities are
presumed  to be trading off the long-term credibility benefits of sticking  relatively close to
their central nominal parity against the monetary-independence  benefits of responding to
short-term developments. But in framing this tradeoff, there is no reason for them to
think of the departure above or below the central  parity in terms of dollars or a basket of
goods, and still less reason to think in terms of Swiss francs.  The most useful way to
phrase these appreciations  and depreciations  is, rather, in terms of an effective exchange
rate, that is, a weighted average of trading partners' currencies.
In this paper we measure values of currencies in terms of a weighted basket of the
G7 currencies.  One possible set of weights is the bilateral trade shares of the smaller
country in question. This has a drawback: it leaves out the role of all the other bilateral
trade partners, as well as third-country markets and competitors. But most of those are
linked to some combination  of the major currencies. Here we adopt the simple approach
of using the G7 countries' weights in gross world production. In this way it is hoped that,
for example, the large weight of the US will roughly reflect the importance of dollar-
linked countries in the trade of Chile or Indonesia  beyond the share of the US in bilateral
18trade of those two countries.' 6 Thus, the exchange  rates, both of the major currencies  and
the  currencies under  study, are calculated as  the  number of  units  of  the currency
necessary  to purchase a weighted  basket of strong currencies.' 7
II.b Empirical Strategy
We use daily data in our empirical experiments.' 8 To  assess how verifiable
different exchange rate regimes are, we use explicit statistical tests  that attempt to
replicate those implicitly carried out by financial market participants to leam about the
actions of the monetary authorities. For countries that have announced a basket band -
such as Chile and Israel during the sample periods we use (examined in section III
below), we  seek  to  establish the amount of information (days) needed to  reach a
judgment on whether the data support the hypothesis that the exchange rate is following
the announced  regime. In the case of currencies  that have declared their regirne as a pure
float - like post-crisis Mexico and Thailand (section IV below) - the purpose of the
exercise is to offer a standard  of comparison  for the first set of currencies.
A test that fails to reject the announced  regime for the currencies following  basket
bands, has low power if the same test also fails to reject an analogous  hypothesis applied
to floating currencies. We wish to see whether the public can distinguish  the two sorts of
policies  statistically, rather  than  having  to  rely  on  the  assumption that  it  can
instantaneously  intuit the true policy of their central bank.
16 A second  advantage  of using  GDP  weights  is that  one does not need  to obtain  the full set of bilateral
trade data  and recompute  a new set of weights  for each country. But using bilateral  trade weights  is a
possible  extension  for  future  research.
17 See  Appendix  2 for  a detailed  description  of the construction  of the numeraire.
's Data on major currencies  and some of the emerging  countries  was extracted  from Bloomberg  and
Datastream.  Data for the case studies  of Chile and Israel was downloaded  from the respective  Central
Banks Web pages.
19To make this approach operational, we summarize the exchange rate regime in
terms of the basket weights in equation (1). Tests of hypotheses about the exchange rate
regime then are just  tests of hypotheses regarding the basket weights.  The tests we
perform  are the following.
Test 1 (TI): Market participants test whether the weights obtained from empirical
estimation of equation (1) are equal to  the announced weights.  Conditional on the
announcement  being true, we expect that this null will not be rejected.  The null and
alternative  hypotheses are:
HO:  wi=  announced  weights;  HA: w 1￿  announced  weights.
Test 2  T2): The second test inquires more generally, whether we can reject that
the currency  is freely floating. We assume that market participants  do not know what the
government  is doing, for example  because the government  has not explicitly announced  a
regine, or else they do not necessarily believe  the announced  exchange rate regime. The
null hypothesis is that the value of the currency follows a random walk with or without
drift. Therefore, we think of market participants  as testing if all the weights on the strong
currencies  are  jointly equal to zero. Formally,
HO: w= 0 ... and ... WN = O; HA:  wI#O  ...  or... wN￿  O.
One problem with this approach is that Test 1 might fail to reject the null due to
lack of power --e.g., if we work with too short a time sample. Market participants know
instinctively that a failure to reject the regime is an informative finding only when that
test would be capable of rejecting the regime in the case where it was false.  To see if
Test 1 has power, we complement it with another experiment in which we replace the
dependent variable with fictitious data and with a floating exchange rate.  Then, we test
20the null hypothesis  that the weights are equal to the ones announced by Chile and Israel.
We perform this experiment for the  cases in  which Test  1 fails to  reject the null
hypothesis. In this experiment,  we expect to reject the null, given that we are using false
weights. Analogously,  to check that Test 2 is not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is
true (i.e., it is not making a Type I error), we perform a similar experiment  for Test 2.  In
this case, we should fail to reject the null hypothesis  of Test 2.19
To estimate equation (1) and carry out inference on its parameters, a variety of
procedures are potentially applicable. In this paper we report results using a "naive"
estimation  procedure, which we implicitly  assume to be the one that market participants
apply to process the observed data. Specifically,  we compute OLS estimates of equation
(1) in firs.t differences. We do this for all the exchange rate regimes explored in the
paper. 20 While nmre  complex models, such as those derived from the recent target zone
literature, might offer some advantage in terms of consistency, their estimation would
also require a vastly larger amount of data. Therefore, we work with these relatively
simple specifications  to carry out our tests and illustrate the point of the paper.
As independent variables for the basket band regimes, we use those currencies
that were included in the announced  basket. In some cases we found that some of these
currencies were strongly correlated over some periods (particularly the Deutsche mark
and French franc, both included in the Israeli basket), so that the estimations were
plagued by severe multicollinearity  and identification  of the specific weights was almost
19 Alternatively  to T2,  which  checks  the  null  that  all  weights  are  zero,  we  used  another  test  of  the  null  that
all  the  strong  currencies  have  the  same  weight,  obtaining  very  similar  rejection  frequencies.
20 The  estimated  models  are  described  in Appendix  2. We  also  experimented  with  more  general  error-
correction  models  allowing  for long-run  equilibrium  and short-run  dynamics,  with the long-term
relationship  linking  the  level  of the  domestic  exchange  rate  with  the  level  of  the  strong-currency  exchange
rates.  In  general  precision  was  poor,  and  the  long-run  equilibrium  poorly  identified.  To  save  space,  we  don't
report  the  results  here.
21impossible. To  solve  this  problem, we  opted  for  computing also  estimates of  a
"restricted" model combining the most highly correlated currencies, using the ratio of
their announced  weights. We return to this below.
III. Verifying  Exchange Rate Bands
Using the framework  and empirical approach just described, this section focuses
on the verifiability  of the exchange rate bands followed by Chile and Israel over recent
years.
TI.a  Chile
A number of successive  exchange rate regimes have been in place in Chile since
the early 1980s.21  In 1982, Chile had a crawling peg vis-a-vis the US dollar, with daily
devaluations  following the difference between domestic and external inflation. The peg
to the dollar continued until 1992, with bands of varying width around the central parity
and with realignments  of the central parity.  In 1992, the government decided to adopt a
target zone around a basket peg. The weights on the currencies deflning the central  parity
changed over time and there were realignments,  but the central parity was always tied to
the US dollar (US$), the Deutsche mark (DM), and the Japanese yen (JY).  Finally, in
September 1999 the central  bank decided to float the peso.
The entire  period  of exchange  rate bands  can be broken  down into a number  of
sub-periods  distinguished  by different  levels of the central parity, basket composition and
band width. To analyze the verifiability  of Chile's exchange  rate band system, we focus
21 A detailed  chronology  of the exchange  rate  system  in Chile  is presented  in Table  A.  1 in  the appendix.
22on seven of those sub-periods,  selected on the basis of a minimum duration (specifically,
those comprising at least 249 daily observations,  amounting to approximately one year).
The relevant parameters characterizing  these sub-periods are summarized in Table l.a.
The first three sub-periods involve a peg to the US dollar with a band, while the last four
involve  a basket peg with a band.
Figure 1 displays the observed exchange rate in terms of the weighted basket
numeraire, along with the announced  bands. The figure shows that the trend of the peso
has been to depreciate over time, with significant appreciations and depreciations on
several occasions, and highlights the fluctuations  of the exchange rate within the band, as
well as the gradual widening of the latter.  In some periods, like 1991-92,  the exchange
rate is close to  the  lower band.  In other periods, like  1994-95, the  exchange rate
fluctuates farther inside the band.  After suffering pressure on the peso, the authorities
decided to  narrow the band  from  12% to  3.5% in  September 1998 to  show their
commitment  to the value of the peso.  The band was widened back to 8% in December
1998.
Table l.b reports the results of the verifiability  tests using the Chilean exchange
rate data, based on first-difference  OLS estimates of the basic equation. For each of the
seven  sub-periods under  consideration, the  table  presents  the  cumulative rejection
frequencies of the null hypotheses of Test 1 and Test 2 at increasing sample sizes - 50,
100 and 200 observations. For example, a rejection frequency of 100 for 50 observations
in Test 2 means that in 100 percent of the estimations  with sample sizes smaller than 50
we can reject the null hypothesis that the weights are equal to 0.22  In addition, the table
also reports point estimates and standard errors of the weight of the US$ in the basket
23defining the central parity (to save space, we omit the estimated weights of the other
currencies). Finally, the last two columns of the table give a measure of the precision of
the estimates, in terms of their mean absolute error - that is,  the  sum of  absolute
deviations of the estimated weights from their announced  values. 23
For periods  4-7,  when the  central parity is  defined by  a  basket of  several
currencies, the table presents two sets of results. The first set is based on an unrestricted
version of the model, in which we  attempt to  estimate the individual weights of all
currencies in the basket. As already mentioned, however, this procedure may run into
difficulties due to the high correlation among some of these currencies in  some sub-
periods, and therefore we also present results from a restricted model version combining
the  most highly-correlated currencies in  the  proportions dictated by  the  announced
weights. In the Chilean case, this involved combining in such fashion the US dollar and
the yen.  24
The results in Table l.b  show a clear difference between periods  1-3 and 4-7,
regardless of whether we use the restricted or unrestricted model in the latter sub-periods.
In the former sub-periods, the point estimates of the US dollar weight approach fairly
quickly the announced weight (equal to one), especially in periods  1-2. In these two
periods the estimated weights are not statistically different from the announced value
(Test 1), but are statistically different from zero (Test 2) for any sample size. In turn, in
sub-period 3, with an increased bandwidth (equal to 5%) relative to periods 1-2, the point
estimate of the US dollar weight still approaches its announced value, although at a
22 The  first  estimation  starts  with  the minimum  number  of observations  required  to estimate  the models.
23  Since the annoumced  weights sum up to 1,  no rescaling is required.
24  The correlation between the first differences of these two currencies exceeds .85 in some of the sub-
periods of analysis.
24somewhat  slower pace than in periods 1-2. However,  we also find a higher rejection rate
in Test I and a somewhat  reduced rejection rate in Test 2. On the whole, these results
tend to suggest  that the widening  band makes verification  more difficult.
In contrast, for periods 4-7, characterized  by a currency basket and much wider
bands, none of the estimates in Table lb  - whether restricted or unrestricted - appears
close to the announced values even after a reasonably large number of observations.
Precision  is much poorer than in the earlier periods, although the restricted estimates are
in general substantially  more precise than the unrestricted  ones (see the last two columns
in the table). In any case, both sets of estimates  appear clearly  biased; indeed, some point
estimates are even negative. As a result, while Test 2 generally rejects the null of zero
weights, Test 1 also rejects the announced  weights in most samples,  and this applies both
to the restricted and unrestricted  estimates.
These results can be more easily understood with the help of Figure 3, which
presents scatter plots of the observed exchange rate of the Chilean peso against the
central parity. In the first three sub-periods, the points cluster along the 45-degree line,
reflecting  a relatively close match between the peso and the central parity. As the band
widens in the last four periods, the peso can fluctuate further away from the central
parity. This is particularly apparent in periods 5-7, whose scatter plots display little or no
clustering  along the 45-degree  line. Thus, it is not surprising  that in the first three periods
the basket weights defining the central parity can be estimated fairly precisely from the
observed  exchange rate data, while this is not the case in later periods. 25
25 The scatter  diagram,  along  with  Figure  1, also  provides  some  clues  for the relatively  poorer  verifiability
of the  third period vis-a-vis the  first  two. In  the  early part of  the  third period (approximately 50
observations),  the exchange  rate  was  practically  pegged  to the upper  part of the band,  but starting  in early
1990 the peso started appreciating until it finally reached the  lower band. This marked break in the
25On the whole, the results for Chile strongly suggest that the widening of the band,
together with the adoption of multiple instead of simple pegs, make verification of the
announced  regime more difficult using simple econometric estimates.  26
III.b Israel
Israel presents another interesting experience of basket band with weight changes
and progressive widening of the band.  During the periods on which we will focus, the
band included the same five currencies [US dollar (US$), Deutsche mark (DM), British
pound (BP), French franc (FF), and Japanese yen (JY)] and the bandwidth rose from 3%
to 15%.
The Bank of Israel had already introduced an exchange rate band around a basket
in  1976.27 It  lasted for a  year before being replaced with a  floating exchange rate,
followed in tum by a dollar peg in 1985 and a basket peg in 1986, with basket weights
determined  by trade shares and subject to relatively frequent revisions. 28
At the beginning of  1989, the Bank of Israel reintroduced a band system by
allowing the exchange rate to  fluctuate within a  region of ±3% around the currency
basket defined by the five currencies already mentioned. The band was later widened to
trajectory of the peso, clearly visible from the scatter plot in Figure 3, is behind the poorer performance of
Tests 1 and 2 in the third period that is apparent from Table lb.
26 One could object that the contrast  between the results we obtain for the earlier and later periods of Chile's
band regime might be due instead to some underlying change in the behavior of the strong currencies or in
the way the peso moved within the band. However, the intuition that verifiability is more difficult with
wider bands and baskets with more currencies is confirmed by the Monte Carlo experiments in Appendix 1,
which are not subject to those objections.
27  For a  detailed account of  the exchange rate policy in  Israel, see  http://www.bankisrael.gov.il and
Appendix Table A.2.
28 The number of units of each currency in the new basket was originally determined according to its share
in trade during the previous calendar year and to international cross rates. Since then, the trade shares were
revised annually  and  when significant changes produced, the  weights and  units  in the  basket were
recalculated.  The number of units  of each currency in the basket is kept  constant, but its  weight -
265% in March 1990, 7% in May 1995, and then gradually since June 1997, to reach 15%
by the end of that year. 29 Most importantly, since December 1991 a pre-announced,
constant rate of crawl was added to both the midpoint and the band - a system known as
a crawling band.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the Israeli exchange rate and the exchange rate
band.  One feature that stands out is the frequency of realignments of the central parity,
particularly in the early years of the band. For the analysis of verifiability, we divided the
sample into different sub-periods characterized by different bandwidth, basket weights
and/or rate  of crawl of the  exchange rate band.  Table 2.a  lists the periods under
consideration,  their beginning and ending dates, and the relevant parameters of the band.
In the case of Israel, collinearity among basket currencies is more of an issue than
in  Chile due to  the larger number of currencies and, especially, to the simultaneous
inclusion of the French franc and DM in the basket.  30  Thus, for the restricted model
estimation we combined the DM with the franc and the US dollar with the yen, using in
each period the ratio of announced weights.
The empirical results for Israel are reported in Table 2.b, which is analogous to
Table l.b for Chile.  It is apparent from the table that the exchange rate system can be
unambiguously verified by our procedure only in the third sub-period (labeled 2.2 in the
table), when the announced weights cannot be rejected by Test 1 and zero weights are
clearly rejected by Test 2 - particularly when using the restricted model estimates. In the
understood  as the share  in the total  cost  of the basket  - can change  daily  according  to changes  in cross  rates
(see  Appendix  2 for  more  details).
29 Appendix  Table  A.2 provides  more  details  on the developments  of exchange  rate  policy  in Israel  since
1986.
30  The correlation  between these two currencies exceeds .98 in  some of  the sub-periods  under
consideration.
27other sub-periods, the unrestricted estimates wander off very far from the announced
values, and lead to rejection of both null hypotheses in the majority of cases, even though
their precision is extremely poor.  In turn, the restricted estimates are much more precise,
and generally closer to the announced weights.  In general, they lead to rejection of the
null of zero weights for sufficiently  large samples in all sub-periods, but tend also to lead
eventually to rejection of the announced  weights except in period 2.2.
Like in the case of Chile, the scatter plots presented in Figure 4 help understand
these empirical results.  Period 2.2 is the only one in which the observed exchange rate
behaved in a fashion similar to the central parity.  During this period, which coincides
with the introduction of a  crawl in the path of the central parity, the exchange rate
hovered around the midpoint of the band, and the boundaries were never reached.
In contrast, during periods I and 2.1 the frequent level adjustments to the band
already mentioned are reflected in the disconnected scatter plots of Figure 4.  From the
perspective of verifiability, these jumps make identification of the basket weights more
difficult. Finally, in the wider-band periods 3-6, the scatter plots are more reminiscent of
those corresponding  to the multiple-currency  periods of the Chilean band: they show little
correspondence  between the central parity and the observed exchange rate.
In summary, one interpretation for the poor verifiability results in the Israeli case
probably lies in the additional complexity induced by  the presence of five mutually
correlated currencies in the central basket.  Even after reducing to three the number of
regressors, identification is still poor.  The sharp discontinuous changes in the central
parity in the earlier periods, and the augmented band width in the later ones, are also
likely obstacles to the verification of the regime.
28III.c Is the Test Informative?
We conclude this section with a reassessment  of the robustness  of our findings for
the cases in which we achieved  verification (periods 1-2 in Chile and 2.2 in Israel). We
do this by constructing a randomly generated  variable  and using it to replace  the observed
exchange rate as dependent variable in the empirical estimation and testing procedures
performed earlier. The results are reported in Table 3, from which it is apparent that Test
1 rejects the announced  weights in most cases, and Test 2 fails to reject the zero weights
in all the cases. This suggests  that problems  with test power are not behind the success in
verifying the exchange regime in these episodes.
As a final exercise to reassess the robustness of  our  findings, we replace the
Chilean peso and the Israeli shekel with the Swiss franc.  We choose the Swiss franc
because Switzerland had a floating regime during the periods of interest.  Table 3 shows
that we reject the null hypothesis  that the weights are equal to the announced  weights. As
reported before, for the same periods, the estimations with the Chilean peso and the
Israeli shekel fail to reject the announced weights.  Therefore, one can conclude that
periods 1-2 in Chile and period 2.2 in Israel are verifiable.
Table 3 also shows that the Swiss franc rejects the null hypothesis that the weights
are equal to zero.  This rejection does not mean that the Swiss franc is not freely floating
during the periods under consideration. Exchange rates are correlated for other reasons
than government intervention.  This tends to yield rejections of zero correlation.  The
next section of the paper explores  whether it is possible to fail to reject free floating using
the methodology  applied for band regimes.
29IV. Verifying Free-Floating  Regimes
We now  turn  to  the  verification of  free-floating regimes.  The  concept of
verifiability has a  different meaning under  floating regimes.  Under these regimes,
governments do not make a commitment to a nominal anchor.  There are no exchange
rate rules to be verified, except that the exchange rate is floating or that the government is
not intervening  in the market.  Applying the methodology used for exchange rate bands,
market participants can check if the exchange rate is uncorrelated  with major exchange
rates.
A rejection of no correlation is not a rejection of a free-floating regime.  Using
observed exchange rate data, it is generally  difficult to fail to reject that weights are equal
to  zero, either because governments intervene or  because exchange rates co-move.
Rejecting zero weights is not necessarily a sign of intervention.  However, failing to
reject zero weights is a clear sign of no intervention (or no pegging to other currencies).
We rejected zero weights in the case of the Swiss franc above. Now, we move to the case
of emerging markets.
Before proceeding with the estirnations,  note that there are other alternative ways
of verifying free-floating  regimes. Market participants can essentially check every month
whether the central bank has intervened by seeing whether its reserve holdings have
changed. Also, banks usually know who is participating in the market, so they can tell
the difference between a system where the central bank never intervenes and where it
intervenes occasionally.  These methods require some type of additional information,
30beyond observed exchange rates. In this paper, for ease of comparison with the previous
section, we stick  to verifiability  just using exchange rate data.
For the verification of floating regimes, we focus on Brazil, Mexico, Peru, South
Korea, and Thailand during specific periods in the 1990s.  These countries provide a good
opportunity to  compare periods of intervention with periods of free-floating.  Brazil,
Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand suffered exchange rate crises in the 1990s, which
forced them  to  abandon previous  exchange rate  arrangements and  adopt  systems
officially described as free-floating  by their respective authorities. Therefore, for these
countries we perform the same statistical tests for periods labeled as free floating and for
periods during which other regimes were in operation - namely periods of managed
floating, bands, crawling  pegs, and basket pegs. Peru, on the other hand, is an interesting
case because despite declaring a free-floating  regime for the entire decade, several papers
have noted that the Peruvian exchange  rate has remained surprisingly  steady. (See Calvo
and Reinhart, 2000, Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein, 2000, and Edwards and Savastano,
1999, for characterizations  of floating regimes.) As in other cases, the observed pattern
calls into question  whether  the government  is in truth following  the regime that it says.
Following the methodology used in the previous section, we estimate our basic
equation (1) for each of these countries over the periods noted in Table 4 and dictated  by
data availability over the  1990s. We allow for a  constant rate  of crawl, include as
regressors the five major currencies (US dollar, yen, DM, British pound and French
franc),  and as before estimate the model by OLS in first differences. 3'
31  As we are only testing the hypothesis of all the weights being equal to zero (a standard goodness of fit
test), we are not concerned  by the potential multicollinearity  problem.
31In free-floating  regimes, we expect to fail to find any peg of the exchange rate vis-
a-vis foreign exchange rates, so we would expect Test 2 not to reject the null of zero
weights. Table 4 reports the percentage of observations  for which the test does reject the
null hypothesis  that weights are equal to zero. If the exchange  rate is in fact free-floating,
one would expect to find low values in the table, meaning that we only find a relationship
between the local currency and strong currencies in very rare occasions.  On the other
hand, when the central bank follows a  specific rule relative to one or several strong
currencies, we  expect  to  find large  values in  the tables  (mostly rejections of  the
hypothesis  that weights are equal to zero).
For ease of comparison,  the shaded areas in Table 4 correspond  to periods labeled
as free-floating. The results displayed in the table show that in the case of pegs, bands,
and managed floating regimes we reject in almost every sample the null hypothesis that
the weights are equal to zero. The only exception  is the case of Brazil, during part of her
period of managed floating. On the other hand, in the episodes declared as free-floating
we generally  fail to reject the same hypothesis. There are two exceptions, however: Peru
and most of the post-Tequila  period in Mexico.
The samples used for the tests reported in Table 4 start at the beginning of the
year except when a specific date is known for the transition to floating. As an alternative
approach, Figure 5 shows the rejection percentage (right-hand scale) of the zero-weights
hypothesis in rolling samples of 100 observations  during the 1990s, together with the
exchange rate vis-A-vis  the US$ (in the left-hand scale).
The pattern is similar to that shown in Table 4. It is possible to see how rejection
rates fall dramatically  right after a major devaluation  in the three countries  affected by the
32late 1990s  crisis: Brazil, Korea, and Thailand.  In the last two cases, we observe a similar
pattern  in the  sense that  after approximately one  year has elapsed since the large
devaluation,  rejection rates appear to rise again. In the Mexican case, rejection rates fall
only during short periods after the late 1994 crisis. Much interest has been devoted to the
Mexican free-floating regime that followed the Tequila episode of  1994, particularly
during the stable period starting in late 1995. Edwards and Savastano  (1998) found that
the volatility of the exchange during 1996 was not smaller than that of other currencies
widely considered as free-floating,  but there seemed to be some form of feedback rule
from the exchange  rate to monetary  policy.
Finally, it is also clear from the figure that periods of marked stability of the
exchange  rate are matched  by rejections  of the zero-weights  hypothesis. Examples of this
are the Brazilian band period (1995-1998), the Korean, Mexican, and Thai pre-crisis
periods, and the Peruvian free-floating  regime of the 1990s.
V. Summary  and Concluding  Remarks
The new conventional  wisdom is that intermediate  exchange rate regimes, such as
baskets, crawls, and bands, are no longer viable. According  to this proposition, countries
are being pushed to the "corners," the extremes of either free floating or firm fixing. We
have argued that a theoretical rationale for this proposition is currently lacking; none of
the candidates  offered  - the impossible  trinity, the dangers of unhedged foreign  liabilities,
or government  reluctance to abandon ship in time - is quite up to the job.  We offered
such a rationale, by introducing the notion of verifiability,  By verifiability  we mean the
ability of a market participant to infer statistically  from observed data that the exchange
33rate regime announced  by the authority is in fact in operation. Verifiability  is an instance
of transparency,  a means to credibility. Our point is that a simple regime such as a clear
dollar peg, or even a free float, may be more verifiable by market participants than a
complicated  intermediate  regime.
In this paper we have made a first attempt at assessing  empirically  the verifiability
of various exchange rate regimes.  We first focused on the verification of exchange rate
bands, drawing from the experiences  of Chile and Israel. In the case of Chile, when the
band was relatively narrow and the peg involved only the dollar, verification is relatively
easy to achieve.  But from 1992 to  1999, when the band became wider and the peg
involved  additional  currencies,  our  simple  statistical  procedures  fail  to  achieve
verification. In the case of Israel, whose basket involved five currencies, two of which
were very  strongly correlated, we only achieve verification in  a period of relatively
narrow band in which the central  parity does not experience sharp realignments, and only
when using a restricted specification  involving a reduced number of currencies. In wider-
band periods, and in narrow-band periods with frequent realignments, our procedures
again fail to achieve verification  of the regime. This is precisely the result we expected.
On the whole, the results suggest  that higher bandwidth,  as well as the adoption of
multiple instead of simple basket pegs, and frequent parity realignments, all make more
difficult  the econometric  verification  of the announced  regime.
The finding that Chile and Israel fail to reject the announced weights for some
particular periods seems to be an informative test.  For the same time periods, we reject
those weights when we replaced the peso and shekel by a randomly generated variable
34and by the Swiss franc.  This means that for narrow bands we are able to verify the
announced  exchange rate regime.
We also examined the verifiability of regimes self-declared as free floating in
several Latin American and East Asian countries in the 1990s - Brazil, Mexico, Peru,
South Korea, and Thailand.  Even though there are different ways to verify floating
regimes, we followed the  same methodology used  for bands.  We tested  whether
supposedly  floating exchange rates are correlated with major exchange rates.  Our tests
do not show significant  evidence against the hypothesis that the exchange rates of these
countries are indeed floating, with the exception of Peru and part of the post-Tequila
period in Mexico. In these cases, we find some evidence  that the exchange rate is in fact
moving along with some weighted combination of strong currencies.  This appears to
agree with the conclusions reached by other researchers. In sum, we fail to reject free-
floating regimes, although cross-currency  correlations tend to reject free-floating  - even
when governments do not intervene.  Whether these findings can be extended for long
periods of free floating, after the high volatility in the aftermath of crises has vanished,  is
a question  for future research.
The analysis in the main text was complemented  by means of Monte Carlo tests
reported in Appendix 1 assessing the effects of bandwidth and number of currencies in
the basket on the time needed to verify exchange rate bands.  On the whole, the results
agree with the above findings.  As  expected, when the range of  variability of the
exchange  rate is relatively large, the number of observations  needed to verify the regime
increases considerably  with the width of the band. The number of observations  needed to
differentiate  the crawling basket from a random variable  in at least half of the samples  is
35under 100 days when the band width is 2%, as it was for Chile from 1985 to 1987, but is
over 500 days when the band width is  10%, as it was for Chile from  1992 to  1998.
Regarding the role of the number of currencies in the basket, we find that moving from a
single-currency parity to a  3-currency basket increases the amount of data needed to
distinguish the basket from a random currency by an extra year's  worth of observations
(assuming a  10% band, and again using the criterion of finding statistically significant
weights at least half the time).
If we are right that it is hard for a central bank to establish credibility for its
proclaimed  monetary  regime  without  verifiability,  then  our  results  confirm  that
complicated combinations of  baskets,  crawls,  and  bands,  are  less  likely  to  satisfy
skeptical investors than are simpler regimes.  We thus offer a possible and much-needed
rationale for the hypothesis of the vanishing intermediate  exchange rate regime.
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38Appendix 1: Monte Carlo Simulations
We turn now to the Monte Carlo simulations, which offer a more general testing
ground for verifiability of intermediate regimes. For our experiments,  we generate 1,000
samples according to the simple model described by equation (1), using for the baskets
actual data on the exchange rates of the major currencies (valued in terms of the GDP-
weighted numeraire). We use daily data between February 1986 and September 1999.
The parameters of the data-generating  process are c (level of exchange rate), d (yearly
rate of crawl), w,...  w3 (weights on US$, DM, and JY), a  (standard deviation of the error
term), and to (initial observation). We use a log linear version of equation (1).  The log
error term is generated as i.i.d. normal with mean zero.  Based on this basic framework,
we study the effect of different model specifications on the amount of time to reject our
proposed null hypotheses.  For each sample, we calculate the number of observations
necessary  to obtain 10 rejections of the null hypothesis that both the weights and the rate
of crawl are zero (Test A) and the null hypothesis that the weights are zero (Test B).
Role of Band Size
Clearly, it should be harder to verify a basket regime with a wide band than one
with a narrow band, and harder to verify a basket regime with a loosely managed float
(i.e., a small tendency to intervene when the exchange rate drifts from the parity) than
another with a tightly managed float (a strong tendency to intervene). To verify the role
of band size in determining tne amount of information needed to reject the proposed null
hypotheses, we  generate sets  of  1,000 samples.  Each  set has  a  different standard
deviation of the underlying disturbance (a), representing different band sizes.
39For this exercise, we generate the samples using a level parameter equal to 1, a
rate of crawl of 1% per year, and equal weights for all major currencies, and starting from
observation 1 (2/24/1986). We let the standard deviation ca  vary from 1% to 10%. In this
regard, recall that 2% was the width of Chile's band from mid-1985 to 1987, and 10%
was the width of the band during the period 1992-97. For purposes of comparison, 21/4%
was the width of the ERM target zone followed by many European countries up until
1992 (and still followed today by Denmark), 6% is the width of the ERM target zone
followed by Italy and the United Kingdom up to 1992, and 15% is the width of the ERM
zone for France and others from 1992 until the beginning of EMU in January 1999.
The results appear in Appendix Figure 1. The graphs plot the quantiles of Test A
and Test 2  against the standard error (a)  used to  generate the samples.  Each line
corresponds to one quantile, and depicts the number of observations needed to achieve
rejection of the null hypothesis (at the 5% level) in x% of the 1,000 samples-where  x is
the quantile in question.
As expected, the graphs show that, for both tests, the number of observations
needed to reject the null of zero weights and rate of crawl in any given percentage of the
samples rises steadily with (.  This is reflected by the fact that the lines corresponding  to
the various quantiles have positive slopes.  In other words, wider bands make it more
difficult for investors to reject specific hypotheses conceming the weights of the central
parity-they  need more time to get an accurate assessment of the parameter values. And
the additional time needed is not negligible.  For Test B, for example, the number of
observations  needed to reject the null in 50% of the samples ranges from under 100 days
40for an (old-) EMU-sized band (2% width) to over 500 for a Chilean-sized one (10%
width).
Role of Number of Currencies in Basket
Intuitively, the  larger the  number of  unknown parameters that  need to  be
estimated, the harder it should be to verify that the data match the announced policy
regime.  This applies not only to the number of currencies in the basket, but also to the
presence of a non-zero  rate of crawl.
To verify this assertion, we next examine the impact of different basket sizes on
the amount of information  needed to reject the nulls underlying Tests A and B.  For this
purpose, different numbers of currencies were included in the Data Generating Process
(DGP). We construct a simple peg (the US dollar), a two-currency  basket (the US dollar
and the Deutsche  mark), and a three-currency  basket (the dollar, the Deutsche mark, and
the Japanese yen).  In  each basket the  currencies are equally weighted. The other
assumptions are like in the previous exercise.
The results are portrayed in Appendix Figure 2.  To avoid cluttering the pictures,
only the medians of Test A and Test B (defined as before) are presented.  They are
plotted against alternative values of the standard deviation of the random disturbance
assumed  in the simulation.
As expected, increasing the number of currencies in the basket shifts the quantile
lines upward, reflecting the fact that for any given value of the standard deviation more
observations  become necessary to reject the null hypotheses. As before, the increase in
information requirements is sometimes substantial.  For example, with a bandwidth of
4110% (as observed in Chile in recent times), moving from a single to a 3-currency basket
raises the 50% quantile of Test B by over 200 observations-implying that an extra year
of data becomes necessary  to reject the null hypothesis.
Role of Rate of Crawl
What about the rate of crawl? Intuitively,  its value should have little consequence
for Test B, which is concerned only with the basket weights. However, for Test A it can
make a big difference-rates  of crawl further away from zero must help reject the null
hypothesis  more quickly, since the latter involves  a zero rate of crawl.
This is verified in Appendix Figure 3, which shows the effects of different rates of
crawl on the verification  time, as reflected by the 50% quantile of Test A and Test B.  For
a given value of a, we generate different samples assuming increasing rates of crawl. As
expected, the time to reject Test A (measured by the left scale) declines steadily as the
rate of crawl rises away from zero, while the time to reject Test B (measured by the right
scale) shows only modest variation.
Role of Period
The power of these tests depends on the precision of the parameter estimates,
itself given by the noise-to-signal ratio-or  the relative size of the variances of the
dependent and independent variables.  When the variance of the dependent variable is
large relative to the variance of the independent  variable, the estimates are imprecise and
it is difficult to reject a given null hypothesis.  Since these relative variances are not
42constant over time, the verifiability  of a given model may depend on the specific time
period over which it is observed.
This can be assessed  using data from different  time periods to carry out the Test A
and B.  Since our experiments use actual data on the hard currencies, any differences in
time to reject Test A and B across replications,  using hard-currency data from different
time periods, should be attributed to changes over time in the variance-covariance  matrix
of the hard currencies.
The results of such an experiment are reported in Appendix Figure 4, which
shows the median values of  the time  to  reject Test A  and  B,  obtained when the
simulations use hard-currency data from different periods in  1986-96 and assuming a
three-currency  basket with equal weights.
To facilitate  the interpretation  of the results, we also show in the figure a measure
of the variance of the hard currencies-specifically, the inverse of the average of their
standard deviations. As the graph shows, variability of the hard-currency  exchange rates
was particularly high in the first and fourth periods considered.  This results in a clear
reduction in time to reject Test A and B in such periods, relative to the rest.
43Appendix  2: Construction  of Numeraire and Estimated  Models
In this appendix,  we describe how we constructed  the weighted basket numeraire
and the precise models we estimated in the case studies of Chile, Israel, and the floating
regimes.
Construction  of the Weighted  Basket Numeraire
The numeraire  was constructed  using the bilateral exchange rates of seven strong
currencies weighted  by the GDP share in 1992. The specific  units of each currency in the
basket were chosen so that the basket is valued in 1 US dollar on January 2, 1990. The
value, in US$, of the weighted basket (WB) at a given point in time is:
VBt=aI  +a2DMt+a3BPt+a4FFt+a5JYt+a6CD,+a7 II  (Al)
such that all the exchange rates are expressed in US$ over local currency. IL stands for
the Italian lira and CD for the Canadian dollar.
Using 1991 GDP at market prices (constant 1995 US$) data from the World
Development  Indicators  report, we defined the following  weights:
Currency  US$  DM  BP  FF  JY  CD  IL
Weight  35.72%  13.01%  5.79%  8.34%  28.25%  2.97%  5.92%
These weights represent the share of the cost of each currency in the total value of
the basket at the reference date (in this case 1/2/1990).  Based on this definition, we can
calculate  the units of each currency (a, ... a7):
w=  a, / WBo  a  a, = w *WBo  (A2)
W2=  a2 DMJ/ WBO  - a2 =  W2*  WBo / DMo
44W3  = a3 BPo/  WBo  - a3 =  W3* WBo  / BPo
The resulting units are the following:
Currency  US$  DM  BP  FF  JY  CD  IL
Units (a,)  0.3572  0.2192  0.03566  0.4803  40.707  0.0499  91.245
Using these units and equation (Al), we obtained the value of the weighted basket
at any point in time. In order to obtain any exchange rate as a function of this numeraire,
we just multiply the exchange rate of the local currency in terms of the US$ by WBt.
Estimation of Basket Weights in Case Studies of Chile, Israel andfree-floating  regimes
In  the two  case studies undertaken in  this paper,  the baskets were,  in  fact,
constructed in  a similar way to  our weighted basket numeraire. When the basket is
defined for the  first  time,  some  strong currencies are  selected. Initial weights  are
calculated according to trade weighs. The units of each currency that are used for the
calculation of the basket from that moment on are defined according to the procedure
described above. The units remain constant over time, but the actual weights of each
currency depend on the bilateral exchange rates movements.
In order to complete the definition of the exchange rate regime, a path must be
defined for the value of the basket (B1).  In some cases, this value is to remain constant,  to
increase at a constant rate or to vary with internal or external inflation rates. The local
exchange rate,  in  the  case  of  a  basket peg,  is  determined by  the  equality of  the
45predetermined path for the value of the basket (A) and the actual value of the basket,
given  the units chosen, the bilateral foreign  exchange rates and the local rate:
Bt = b 1 St + b2 St*DMA  + b3 St*BPt  + b4 St*FFt  + b5 St*JYt,
where St represents the local currency (in this example the Israeli Shekel vis-a-vis the
US$). Using a formula analogous  to (A2), we can express  the previous equation in terms
of the original weights:
Bj/Bo=  w, St/SO+  w2 (StDMK)/(  SODMO)+  W3 (St*BPt)/( SOBPO)+  W4 (St*FFt)/( SOFFo)+  W 5
(St*JYt)/(  SoJYo).
Rewriting the previous expression  with the local currency  on the LHS, we have:
SOSt  =  wl BJBt + w2 BWBt*DMt/DMO  +  w3 B&Bt*BPt/BPo  +  W 4 BO/Bt*FFt/FFo  +  w5
B3Bt  *JYt/JYO.
Finally, multiplying  both sides of the previous equation by WB/WBt  we obtain
an equation where all the exchange rates  are expressed in termns  of the  numeraire.
Redefining  variables, we obtained  the following  equation:
Y, =  w, XUSt + w 2 XDMK  +  W3 XBPt  +  W4 XFFt +  W5 XJYt.  (A3)
In the case of basket bands, the actual value of the basket is allowed to fluctuate
around the predetermined  path, usually with a given percentage above or below (the band
width). In those cases, we refer to the reference path as central parity. Equivalently,  the
band defined for the basket implies an analogous band for the local exchange rate vis-a-
vis the numeraire.
In  our  analysis, we try  to  recover the original announced weights from the
observed exchange rate, the bilateral exchange rates between the strong currencies and
the predetermined  path for the central parity. The movements of the observed exchange
46rate inside the band give rise to an error terrn. A stationarity assumption  is certain to fail
in a time series for the level of the exchange rate.  A simple way to deal with this is to
work with first differences. The basic equation we estimate in this paper, expressed in
first differences,  is the following:
AY,  = do  + w, AXUSt  + W2  AXDM  + W3  AXBPt  + W4  AXFFt  + w5  AXJYt  + et.  (A3)
For the Chilean case, in the first three periods we included only the US$ and in the
following  four periods, the US$, the DM, and the JY.
As described in the next section, we finally used a restricted  version of equation (A3) for
the case studies of Chile and Israel but in the case of the free-floating countries, we
estimated equation (A3) without worrying about the multicollinearity  problem.
Dealing with MulticoUinearity
As mentioned in the text,  strong correlation between the included regressors
(particularly between AXDMt and AXFFt and between AXUSt and  AXJY, in some
periods) gave rise to a significant multicollinearity  problem. In order to deal with it, we
combined  pairs of regressors,  using the ratio of announced  weights:
AYt = do +  wI (AXUSt  +  W50 / WIO AXJYt)  +  w 2 (AXDMt  +  W 4 0 / W20 AXFFt)+
W3 AXBPt  + et  (A5)
where  w 1O, w20, w40 and  w50 represent the  announced weights  (which  are  known
constants). With  this  specification, we  were  able  to  identify  only  the  following
parameters:  do,  wI, w2 and W3.
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0  0Table l.a:  Chilean Exchange Rate
Description of Exchange Rate Regimes
Period  Weights of Central Parity
Begin  End  Number of  Band  U.S.  Deutsche Japanese
Observations Width (+/-)  Dollar  Mark  Yen
1  February  24, 1986  January 4, 1988  434  2%  100%  0%  0%
2  January 5, 1988  June 5, 1989  340  3%  100%  0%  0%
3  June 6, 1989  April 2, 1991  449  5%  100%  0%  0%
4  July 1, 1992  October 31,1994  580  10%  50%  30%  20%
5  November 30, 1994  November 30, 1995  236  10%  45%  30%  25%
6  December 1, 1995  January 20, 1997  264  10%  45%  30%  25%
7  January 21, 1997  June 24, 1998  326  12.5%  80%  15%  5%
Only  periods  with  at least  250  observations  are listed.  During  these  periods  there  were  no changes  in  the exchange
rate regime. The bands' width,  the weights  of the central  parity, and the level of the central  parity  were held
constant. The  periods  excluded  include  discrete  devaluations  /revaluations  of the central  parity. For more  details
about the exchange  rate  regimes  in Chile,  see Appendix  table. The announced  weights  correspond  to the relative
importance  of the respective  currency  in the first  day when  any new weight  is defined.  With  relative  movements
between  the foreign  currencies,  those weights  vary with  time.  The estimation  procedure,  however,  is designed  to
estimate  the initial  weight.Table 1.b: Chilean Exchange Rate
Percentage  of Observations  for Which Null Hypothesis Is Rejected (1%)
Period  Obs  OLS  OLS  Precision
First Differences  First Differences  Xiw-wol
Unrestricted  Model  Restricted  Model
Test 1  Test 2  Point  Test 1  Test 2  Point  OLS  OLS
Ho:  Ho:  Estimate  Ho:  Ho:  Estimate  First  First
Weights  Weights  Wus$  Weights  weights  Wuss  Differences Differences
=  = 0  (s.e.)  =  =0  (s.e.)  Unrestricted  Restricted
announc  announcMoe  Mdl ~~flflOUflC  ~flflOUflC  Model  Model
1  50  0  100  0.94 (0.06)  0.06
US$ band  100  0  100  0.90 (0.07)  0.10
width=2%  200  0  100  0.92 (0.05)  0.08
WUS$1
2  50  0  100  1.27 (0.19)  0.27
US$ band  100  0  100  1.09  (0.13)  0.09
width=3%  200  0  100  1.00 (0.07)  0.00
Wuss=l
3  50  21  92  0.80 (0.09)  0.20
US$ band  100  22  97  0.85 (0.05)  0.15
width=5%  200  :34  98  0.90 (0.07)  0.10
WUSS=1_
4  50  100  100  1.10  (0.15)  100  100  1.08 (0.15)  0.90  0.87
basket  100  100  100  1.10 (0.09)  100  100  1.09 (0.08)  1.08  0.90
width=10%  200  100  100  1.04 (0.06)  100  100  1.04 (0.06)  1.06  0.87
Wus==0.5
5  50  68  68  1.01 (0.55)  68  79  1.38 (0.26)  1.37  1.07
basket  100  86  86  1.67 (0.28)  86  91  1.02 (0.09)  1.69  0.95
width=10%  200  94  94  1.19 (0.22)  94  96  1.07 (0.08)  1.19  0.97
Wuss=O.45
6  50  58  50  0.37 (0.44)  45  45  0.95 (0.21)  1.44  0.86
basket  100  82  78  0.81 (0.25)  76  76  1.10 (0.12)  1.31  0.98
width=10%  200  91  90  1.02 (0.17)  89  89  1.12 (0.08)  1.27  1.00
Wus$=0.45
7  50  13  100  1.08 (0.14)  26  100  0.97 (0.07)  0.38  0.25
basket  100  63  100  1.14(0.11)  68  100  1.03 (0.04)  0.44  0.33
width=12.5% 200  82  100  0.83 (0.16)  85  100  0.95 (0.07)  0.38  0.31
Wus$=0.8
In  periods  1-3, only the US$ was considered in the estimation. Precision is  calculated as  the  sum of
absolutes deviations of the estimated weights at 50, 100 and 200, with respect to the announced weights. In
the restricted model, for periods 4 to 7, the JY and the US$ were combined in one variable, using the relative
announced  weights. See Appendix 2 for details.Table 2.a: Israeli Exchange Rate
Description of Exchange Rate Regimes
Period  Weights of Central Parity
Begin  End  Number  Band  U.S.  Deutsche  Japanese  French  British
of  Width  Dollar  Mark  Yen  Franc  Pound
Observations  (+/-)
1  January  3,  February  291  3%  60%  20%  5%  5%  10%
1989*  28, 1990
2.1 March 1,  December  443  5%  60%  20%  5%  5%  10%
1990  16, 1991  no crawl
2.2 December  May  30,  851  5%  60%  20%  5%  5%  10%
17, 1991  1995  crawling
3  May  31,  April  29,  222  7%  54.8%  24.2%  1%  5.6%  8.3%
1995  1996
4  April  30,  June 17,  273  7%  60.3%  21%  5.6%  5.1%  8%
1996  1997
5  June 18,  December  374  15%**  60.3%  21%  5.6%  5.1%  8%
1997  31, 1998
*  The basket was introduced  with the presented weights in August, 1986,  but the exchange rate was allowed
to vary around a 3% band in January 1989.
** Widening band designed  to reach 15% by end of  1997.Table 2.b: Israeli Exchange Rate
Percentage of Observations  for Which Null Hypothesis Is Rejected (1%)
Period  Obs  OLS  OLS  Precision
First Differences  First Differences  £|w-woI
Unrestricted  Model  Restricted Model
Test 1  Test 2  Point  Test 1  Test 2  Point  OLS  OLS
Ho:  Ho:  Estimate  Ho:  Ho:  Estimate  First  First
Weights  Weights  Wuss  Weights  weights  Wuss  Differences Differences
=  =°0  (s.e.)  - =0  (s.e.)  Unrestricted  Restricted
aniounc  announc  Model  Model
1  50  29  92  -1.37 (0.40)  0  89  0.64 (0.10)  3.94  0.06
basket  100  69  97  -2.52 (0.25)  0  95  0.45 (0.10)  6.19  0.29
width=3%  200  86  98  0.43 (0.02)  44  98  0.43 (0.02)  0.48  0.27
Wus$=0.6
2.1  50  100  100  -5.10 (0.24)  0  0  0.31 (0.34)  11.49  0.79
basket  100  100  100  -5.30 (0.15)  0  7  -0.12 (0.25)  11.98  0.91
width=5%  200  100  100  0.15 (0.07)  46  40  0.09 (0.06)  1.33  0.68
(w/o crawl)
Wuss=0.6
2.2  50  0  89  -0.54 (0.36)  0  97  0.53 (0.07)  2.42  0.14
basket  100  0  95  0.01 (0.31)  0  99  0.57 (0.08)  1.55  0.11
width=5%  200  2  98  0.22 (0.13)  0  99  0.55 (0.05)  0.80  0.07
(with crawl)
Wuss=0.6
3  50  63  100  -1.28 (0.44)  39  100  0.60 (0.15)  5.23  0.29
basket  100  84  100  -0.62 (0.30)  67  100  0.84 (0.08)  3.89  0.47
width=7%  200  93  100  -1.52 (0.21)  85  100  0.73 (0.08)  6.37  0.36
Wus$=0.54 8
4  50  100  100  -3.59 (0.45)  0  0  0.53 (0.25)  11.35  0.82
basket  100  100  100  -2.89 (0.32)  55  55  0.55 (0.17)  9.54  0.55
width=7%  200  100  100  -2.97 (0.25)  76  79  0.47 (0.12)  9.30  0.40
Wuss=O.603
5  50  100  100  -5.54 (0.46)  0  0  0.91 (0.30)  15.39  0.67
basket  100  100  100  -4.52 (0.36)  15  51  0.97 (0.17)  13.18  0.62




Precision is calculated as the sum of absolutes deviations of the estimated weights at 50, 100 and 200, with
respect to the announced weights. In the restricted model, the DM and the FF on the one hand, and the US$
and the JY on the other, were combined using the relative announced weights, to form new variables. See
Appendix 2 for details.Table 3: Swiss Franc and Randomly Generated  Variable as Dependent Variable
Percentage of Observations  for Which Null Hypothesis  Is Rejected (1%)
Swiss Franc  Random
Period  Obs  Test  1  Test 2  Test  1  Test 2
Ho:  Ho:  Ho:  Ho:
Weights  =  Weights  Weights=  Weights
announced  = 0  announced  = 0
Announcement:  50  100  100  97  0
Chile-Period  I  100  100  100  99  0
200  100  100  99  0
Announcement:  50  100  100  89  0
Chile-Period  2  100  100  100  95  0
200  100  100  98  0
Announcement:  50  100  100  76  0
Israel-Period  2.2  100  100  100  90  0
200  100  100  95  0
The rejection  percentages  were recalculated  for the referred  country  periods,  replacing  in each case
the local currency  with the Swiss franc and a randomly  generated  data. Fictitious  data were
generated  following  an AR(I) process  with  parameters  obtained  by fitting  an AR(l) model  to the
original  dependent  variable.Table 4: Floating Exchange Rate  Regimes - First Differences  Linear  Model
Percentage  of Observations  for Which HO:  Weights=O Is Rejected  (1%)
Brazil
obs.  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Mana ed Floatin2  Band  Free Fl
20  0  0  0  0  90.9  100  90.9  0
50  0  0  0  73.2  97.6  100  97.6  0
100  0  41.8  2.2  87.9  98.9  100  98.9  0
150  0  62.4  1.4  92.2  99.3  100  99.3  0
200  0  72.3  1  94.2  99.5  100  99.5
Mexico
obs. 1990 1991 1992 1993  1994  99  196  17  Sf  99
CrawlingPeg  _  _  eeE1oati;>
20  100  72.7  100  100  100  0  0  ;  18.2  0  34
50  100  92.7  100  100  95.1  2  2  2  8  78
100  100  96.7  100  100  97.8  604  5  68  484  01
150  100  97.9  100  100  98.6  7,  16  7.  75  9.
200  100  98.4  100  100  99  6  -
Peru
obs.  99  94  IS  $6  17  198  99
209.  94  9.0
50  52  7.  ~  6A  5.  76  7.
150  58  1.  752  94  8.5  93  74
200  ~,  37  8.  21  . 9.
S. Korea
obs.  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  98  19
Mn"aged  Floating
20  100  90.9  100  63.6  45.5  54.5  18.2  18.2  0
50  100  97.6  100  90.2  85.4  87.8  61  26.8  00
100  100  98.9  100  95.6  93.4  94.5  82.4  67  00
150  100  99.3  100  97.2  95.7  96.5  88.7  78.7  142  3.6
200  100  99.5  100  97.9  96.9  97.4  91.6  84.3
Thailand
obs.  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  (I' half)  19("'af  98  19
Basket Peg  Fe  ll
20  100  90.9  81.8  100  100  100  63.6  10000  0
50  100  97.6  95.1  100  100  100  90.2  10000  0
100  100  98.9  97.8  100  100  100  95.6  100  90  0  9.
150  100  99.3  98.6  100  100  100  97.2  1  1  0  41.8
200  100  99.5  99  100  100  100  97.9  1.  . 0Appendix Figure 1: Monte Carlo Simulations-Role  of Band Size
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Parameters of estimations: 500 samples; weights on dependent variables 1/3 for US$, DM, and JY; initial
observation  February 24, 1986; constant=-1;  rate of crawl=0.10; sigma={0.01;  0.028; 0.046; 0.064; 0.082;
0.1 }. Quantile values are calculated for the first 10 rejections.Appendix Figure  2:
Monte Carlo Simulations-Role  of Number of Currencies  in Basket
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Parameters  of  estimations:  500  samples;  initial  observation February  24,  1986; constant=,;  rate  of
crawl=0.10; sigma={0.01; 0.048; 0.086; 0.124; 0.162; 0.2}; weights on dependent variables are 1, 1/2, and
1/3, for 1, 2, and 3 currencies in the basket respectively.  Quantile values are calculated for the first 10
rejections.Appendix Figure 3: Monte Carlo Simulations-Role  of Rate of Crawl
Median Valules for Tests A & B
Test A  Test B
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TestA  -- TestB
Test  A:  Weights=Rate  of Crawl=O  Test  B: Weights=O
Parameters  of estimations:  500  samples;  initial  observation  February  24, 1986;  constant=l;  rate  ofcrawl=
{0.01;  0.108;  0.206;  0.304;  0.402;  0.5};  sigma=O.1;  weights  on dependent  variables  are equal  to 1/3  for each
currency  in the basket.  Median  values  are calculated  for the first 10  rejections.Appendix Figure 4:
Monte Carlo Simulations-Role  of Period and Variability of Regressors
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_Inverse  Variance  of US$, DM, JY  - Median  Test B
Parameters of  estimations: 500  samples; weights  on dependent variables  1/3 for  US$,  DM, and  JY;
constant=1; rate of crawl=O.O0;  sigma=0.005. Median values are calculated for the first 10 rejections.
"Inverse Variance" is the inverse of the average standard error of the three currencies, for the first 50
observations  of each respective  period.Appendix Table A.1: Exchange Rate Policy in Chile 19982-1999
Date  Policy
September, 1982  *  Daily devaluations  in line with domestic inflation in the preceding month
minus an estimate of external inflation
August 1, 1984  *  Band of +/- 0.5%
June, 1985  *  Widening to 2%
January 5, 1988  *  Widening to 3 %
June 6, 1989  *  Widening to 5%
*  Accelerate the rate of real depreciation,  which was achieved by reducing the
estimate of international  inflation
*  Adjustment of central parity: previous month inflation minus estimated
international inflation
April 3, 1991  *  2% revaluation of central parity
January 23, 1992  *  Band widened to 10% (from +1-5%)
*  Discrete 5% revaluation of central parity
March, 1992  *  Managed floating is authorized
July, 1992  *  Central parity: 50% U.S. dollar, 30% Deutsche mark, 20% Japanese  yen
November, 1994  *  Central parity: 45% U.S. dollar, 30% Deutsche mark, 25% Japanese yen
November 30, 1994  *  9.66% revaluation of central parity
December, 1995  *  2% revaluation; 2% annual revaluation
January 21, 1997  *  4% revaluation of central parity
- New band: +/- 12.5%
- New weight: 80% U.S. dollar, 15%  Deutsche mark, 5% Japanese yen
June 25, 1998  . 2% annual revaluation
- New asymmetric  band: +2%, -3,5%
September 16, 1998  *  New band: +/- 3.5%
*  The band is widened  progressively  until it accumulates and additional 1.5%
in each extreme , such that by the end of the year the band would be +/- 5%
*  New estimates of annual international  inflation from 2.4% to 0% for the rest
of the year
*  The relevant internal inflation rate is the inflation target and not past
inflation
December 23, 1998  *  New band: +/-8%
*  No change in other parameters (central  parity adjusts only with internal
inflation and the band continue widening daily by 0,013575%)
January 1, 1999  . Deutsche  mark is replaced  by the euro, with the same weight
September 2, 1999  . Free floating with managed intervention  only in exceptional cases
*  Release of new information  regarding interventions  in the foreign exchange
markets
Source:  Central  Bank  of Chile,  Hussey  and  Morande  (1996),  and  Vergara  (1994)Appendix Table A.2: Exchange  Rate Policy in Israel 1986-1999
Date  Policy
August 1, 1986  *  Beginning of basket peg without crawl
*  Initial weights: 60% US$, 20% DM, 10% BP, 5% FF, 5% JY
January 3, 1989  *  Central parity is devaluated 13% in a week
*  A ±3% band is introduced
June 23, 1989  *  Midpoint raised  by 6%
March 1, 1990  *  Midpoint  raised by 6%
*  Band widened  to ±5%
September 10, 1990  *  Midpoint  raised  by 10%
March 11, 1991  *  Midpoint  raised  by 6%
December 17, 1991  *  Introduction  of crawling  band
*  Midpoint  raised  by 3%
*  Slope of band 9%
November 9, 1992  *  Midpoint  raised by 3%
*  Slope reduced to 8%
July 26, 1993  *  Midpoint  raised by 2%
*  Slope reduced to 6%
May 31, 1995  *  Midpoint  raised by 0.8%
- Band widened  to ±7%
*  No change to slope
*  Weights. 54.8% US$, 24.2% DM, 8.3% BP, 5.6% FF, 7.1% JY
April 30, 1996  *  Weights: 60.3% US$, 21% DM, 8% BP, 5.1% FF, 5.6% JY
June 18, 1997  *  Band widened  to reach ±15%  by end of year
*  Slope of lower limit 4%
*  Slope of upper limit 6%
August 17, 1]998  *  Slope of lower limit 2%
o  Slope of upper limit 6%
January 4, 1999  *  DM and FF are replaced  by Euro
*  Weights: 61.4% US$, 8.9% BP, 5.2% JY, 24.5% Euro
Source:  Bank  of Israel,  "Foreign  Cuirency  Exchange  Rates  In Israel 1999,"  January  2000.Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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